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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Examining Anti-LGBT Consequences of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias
by
Chad Miller
Master of Arts in Psychological and Brain Sciences
Social and Personality Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2021
Professor Clara Wilkins, Chair
Christians in the US report increasing perceptions of anti-Christian bias, but little research has
examined the consequences of these perceptions. Three Experiments provide evidence that for
White, heterosexual, cisgender Christians, perceiving anti-Christian bias causes prejudice against
gay and lesbian people – particularly when the latter are perceived as influential. Participants
primed with anti-Christian bias reported lower warmth toward gay and lesbian and transgender
people (relative to those who read about bias toward an outgroup) (E1 and E2). This effect was
stronger for Christians who see gay people and transgender people, respectively, as having a
significant cultural influence in U.S. society (E2). Experiment 3 examined the causal role of
influence. Christian participants rated the qualifications of a gay applicant for an editor position
that either had influence over article content or was simply a copy editor. Participants in the antiChristian bias condition (but not in the control) rated the gay applicant as less hirable for the
influential editor position than the non-influential position.

vii

Chapter 1: Introduction
“First is the force, fervor, and comprehensiveness of the assault on religion we are
experiencing today. This is not decay; it is organized destruction. Secularists, and their
allies among the ‘progressives,’ have marshaled all the force of mass communications,
popular culture, the entertainment industry, and academia in an unremitting
assault on religion and traditional values.”
-Bill Barr (United States Department of Justice, 2019)
As exemplified in Bill Barr’s warning (quoted from his speech while Attorney General to
the University of Notre Dame), Christians in America are increasingly concerned about bias
against their group. Christians perceive that anti-Christian bias has increased over time, and they
anticipate facing equivalent levels of bias as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
people in the current decade (Wilkins et al., 2021). Perceptions of Christian victimization are
particularly pronounced among White evangelical Christians (who accounted for 17% of
American Christians (Cox & Jones, 2017)) – the majority of whom (57%) report that their group
faces “a lot of discrimination” (Jones et al., 2017; Vandermaas-Peeler et al., 2018). In this paper,
I explore the consequences of believing the most populous religious group in America (see Pew
Research Center, 2019) experiences bias.
I propose that (1) perceptions of anti-Christian bias will lead Christians to perceive that
their values and beliefs are threatened and (2) that Christians will consequently express bias
toward groups whose values and beliefs are seen as conflicting with their own: namely lesbian,
gay, and transgender (LGT) people. I believe discrimination toward outgroups will be
particularly severe when the group is perceived as wielding significant social influence.
Specifically, I predict that Christians who are concerned about bias against their group will
1

express prejudicial attitudes toward LGT people because LGT people are seen as violating
traditional Christian values (Herek, 1988). I also predict that prejudice against LGT people will
be a function of perceived LGT influence because influence allows LGT people to spread values
perceived as conflicting with Christians’.

1.1 Why do Christians Perceive Themselves as Victims
Christians may increasingly identify as victims of discrimination as a response to rapid
social change in the United States. Perhaps the most pertinent example of social change is the
declining percentage of Americans who identify as Christian (Pew Research Center, 2019).
While Christians maintain their majority status, some may interpret religious demographic shifts
as a sign America is actively turning away from Christianity. Religious scholar Robert Jones
(2016) argues that White Christians are losing the stronghold they once held over America (e.g.,
near single-handedly deciding elections). In fact, White Christians who read about Christians’
declining population and decreasing cultural influence perceive greater anti-Christian bias than
those in a control condition (Wilkins et al., 2021).
Some conservative Christians have also interpreted recent social changes as evidence
America is becoming forcibly secularized. For example, many Christian politicians have referred
to the legalization of same-sex marriage as an attack on religion; former attorney general Jeff
Sessions referred to the Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges ruling (2015) as “an effort to
secularize, by force and intimidation” (Sommerfeldt, 2016). Virginia House of Delegates
Representative (R) Todd Gilbert went a step further and argued that same-sex marriage activists
“will not be satisfied until people of faith are driven out of this discourse, are made to cower, are
made to be in fear of speaking their minds, of living up to their deeply held religious beliefs”
(Portnoy, 2016). The alleged attack on Christian religious rights prompted the creation and
2

passage of several religious freedom laws (e.g., Religious Freedom Defense Act, 2015; HB4773,
2015). Clearly, some Christians perceive gains for lesbian and gay individuals as coming at a
cost to Christians; in particular, cisgender, heterosexual Christians are more inclined than other
groups (e.g., members of other religious groups) to report they are in a zero-sum relationship
with LGBT people (Wilkins et al 2021).
Thus, for various demographic and cultural reasons, Christians are increasingly inclined
to see their group as victimized. In this paper, I address the question of what impact this belief
has for Christians and how they react to this growing perception of victimization.

1.2 Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias is Threatening to Christians
Regardless of the cause, perceiving bias likely is threatening to Christians. Perceiving
bias against the ingroup is associated with poorer mental and physical health and with heightened
physiological stress responses (Pascoe & Richman, 2009). Moreover, perceiving pervasive
discrimination against the ingroup is negatively related to well-being and increases ingroup
identification to buffer the effect (Branscombe et al., 1999). The relationship between perceiving
discrimination and reduced well-being is not unique to disadvantaged groups; advantaged group
members’ perceptions of discrimination is also negatively associated with well-being, albeit to a
weaker extent than low-status group members (Schmitt et al., 2014). Thus, regardless of whether
Christians are actually disadvantaged in the United States, they are likely to suffer negative
psychological and physiological consequences from perceiving discrimination.
Groups who perceive bias may lash out toward other groups in response to threat that
arise from perceiving bias. Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 2009) may be useful
for characterizing the nature of this threat and in clarifying the consequences other groups may
suffer as a result of perceived victimization. ITT distinguishes between two types of threat which
3

independently predict prejudice toward groups: (1) symbolic threat, or perceived threats to one’s
values and beliefs, and (2) realistic threat, or perceived threats to one’s resources, safety, and/or
power.
Perceiving bias against Christians may encompass both types of threat, but Christians in
America likely experience symbolic threat to a greater extent (Wilkins et al., 2021). In other
words, they are more likely concerned about threats to their values and beliefs than to material
outcomes. For example, while half (50%) of surveyed Americans reported that evangelical
Christians faced discrimination, much fewer (15%) said being an evangelical Christian would
hurt one’s chances of getting ahead (Masci, 2019). Furthermore, Christian group membership is
defined by a shared set of Christian beliefs (e.g., that Jesus is the messiah and son of God
(Christianity, n.d.)). Thus, any threats based on group membership likely emanate from a threat
to religious values and further suggests that symbolic threat may be a more dominant concern
than realistic threat for Christians.
Thus, Christians who perceive anti-Christian bias are likely to perceive it as a significant
threat to their group. The threat will likely manifest in particular as concern about Christian
values.

1.3 Perceiving Threats to Christian Values Leads to Bias Against LGT People
When groups experience threat, they are inclined to display bias against groups perceived
of as relevant to the threat. For example, when a threat is perceived as jeopardizing resources or
welfare more generally, prejudice can increase toward competitive or dangerous groups (e.g.,
Brambilla & Butz, 2013; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).
Concerns about conflicting values also shapes intergroup attitudes. For example, Black
and fat people are derogated when they are perceived as not living up to the Protestant ethic
4

(Crandall, 1994; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). Thus, perceived violations of the
ingroup’s values and beliefs also leads to bias, and this bias is likely to be displayed when groups
perceive threats to their values and beliefs (Rios et al., 2018). Because Christians are likely more
concerned about threats to their values than to their welfare, they may display bias against groups
perceived as violating Christian values.
The display of bias against groups with conflicting values after being symbolically
threatened can occur even when those groups are not strictly responsible for the initial value
threat. For example, two sets of experiments manipulated the perception that morality is faltering
in general (without mentioning any specific “immoral” groups) and found increased prejudice
toward specific groups who are commonly perceived as violating values (Brambilla & Butz,
2013; Cook et al., 2015). This may be an important consideration because it is possible
Christians do not perceive a particular group as promulgating bias against Christians. Thus,
regardless of whether any specific groups are blamed for the alleged increase in anti-Christian
bias, concerns about values that result from perceiving anti-Christian bias may result in prejudice
toward groups whose values are seen as being in conflict with Christians.
Christians likely perceive that gay and lesbian people directly violate Christian values
(e.g., Herek, 1988; Rodriguez, 2009), and thus, LGBT individuals may be prime targets of
prejudice for Christians concerned about bias against their ingroup. For example, almost half
(47%) of surveyed Americans who opposed same-sex marriage cited religious or biblical
reasoning (Newport, 2012). Similarly, research has linked Christianity and Christian religiosity
to anti-transgender prejudice (Campbell et al., 2019). Christians may perceive divine creation of
men and women as normalizing the (cis)gender binary and as excluding transgender individuals
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(Campbell et al., 2019). Thus, Christians might be particularly inclined to discriminate against
gay and potentially transgender people in response to perceived value threat.
I also explore a potential mechanism explaining why prejudice results from perceived
clashing values. I expect value-driven increases in prejudice against gay and transgender people
to partly occur from concern that gay and transgender people will spread their values beyond the
confines of their groups. Thus, threatened Christians may be particularly inclined to display bias
when they perceive gay and transgender people as influential enough to disseminate their values.

1.4 Hypotheses and Experiment Overview
To reiterate my predictions, I expect perceiving anti-Christian bias will cause Christians
to perceive their beliefs and values are threatened (symbolic threat) and will subsequently
increase prejudice toward groups who (1) allegedly hold disconsonant values to those of
Christians, namely LGT people, and (2) hold sufficient influence to spread these values.
There is some correlational evidence to support the notion that perceiving anti-Christian
bias increases prejudice toward several groups. Pasek & Cook (2019) revealed that perceptions
of religious threat and stigmatization (e.g., being disliked by others, experiencing discriminatory
treatment, etc.) was associated with aggregated prejudice toward seven groups (e.g., atheists and
gays/lesbians). However, their research was correlational, and the relationship could plausibly be
explained by a third, confounding variable like political orientation. For example, Republicans
are more likely than Democrats to perceive discrimination against Evangelical Christians (Masci,
2019), and Republicans are also more intolerant of groups perceived of as liberal like gays and
lesbians and atheists (Brandt et al., 2014). My research manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian
bias to determine causality and furthermore tests the mechanism that leads to intergroup bias.

6

To test my contentions, I conducted three experiments manipulating perceptions of antiChristian bias in the United States. Experiment 1 tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias
causes prejudice against gay or lesbian people and atheists. Experiment 2 tested whether the
prejudice observed in Experiment 1 is statistically mediated by symbolic threat. Experiment 2
also measured perceived influence of each target group and tested whether the effect of
perceiving anti-Christian bias on prejudice is exacerbated when the target group is perceived as
influential. Experiment 3 manipulated influence to determine its causal role in enabling
discrimination toward LGT people.
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1
In my first experiment, I manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias in the U.S. and
measured warmth toward several target groups including gay and transgender individuals,
religious and non-religious groups, and racial outgroups (e.g., Black, Asian, and Latinx
Americans).
I predicted that participants exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation would report
less warmth toward gay or lesbian people relative to those assigned to a control condition.
Because there is less research on Christians’ attitudes toward transgender people, I did not make
predictions regarding warmth toward transgender people.
I also predicted that participants assigned to read about anti-Christian bias would report
less warmth toward atheists. I expected that perceiving anti-Christian bias would elicit more
negative attitudes toward atheists because atheists clearly contradict Christian values and beliefs.
The most conspicuous example of which is that atheists reject the core tenet of Christianity: that
God exists. Moreover, 63% of Protestants and 52% of Catholics in the United States indicated
that “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values” (Tamir et al.,
2020). This suggests many U.S. Christians perceive that atheists are unable to attain equivalent
levels of morality as Christians.
It is less clear whether Christians would respond similarly negatively toward other
religious groups (e.g., Muslims and Jews). There may be a shared understanding among religious
groups, and particularly Abrahamic groups (i.e., Christians, Muslims, and Jews), that their
religious traditions share similarities. For example, Christians’ beliefs about Abrahamic religion
similarity is associated with increased support for Muslims (Kunst & Thomsen, 2015), although
it is unclear how common such a belief is or whether threat can increase perceived similarity of
8

Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. If perceiving anti-Christian bias increases perceptions of
Abrahamic commonalities, threat could counterintuitively produce more positive attitudes
toward some non-Christian religious groups. Because I was unsure whether threatened Christians
would perceive religious outgroups as similar to their group, I made no predictions regarding
warmth toward religious outgroups.
It is unclear how Christians will respond to Black people after perceiving anti-Christian
bias. There is some mixed evidence that Black Americans are perceived by White Christians as
violating Christian values. One set of experiments found that participants primed with Christian
words reported more racial bias than participants primed with neutral words (Johnson et al.,
2010). However, participants were neither exclusively Christian nor exclusively White, and it is
unclear if the manipulation primed religious values or separate religious concepts. In contrast, a
meta-analysis revealed that while religious identification was associated with racism,
endorsement of Christian-specific religious beliefs did not reliably predict racism (Hall et al.,
2010). This implies that Black people are perceived as being at odds with religiosity more than
with Christianity. Moreover, Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to identify
as Christian (Masci et al., 2018). Therefore, White Christians may perceive Black people as
equally or more affected as White Christians by perceived increases in anti-Christian bias and
thus, may be perceived of as part of the ingroup. Because of the conflicting findings, I made no
predictions as to how attitudes toward Black people would change as a function of anti-Christian
bias perceptions.
Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered hypotheses, planned
analyses, and exclusion criteria are posted on OSF
(https://osf.io/5qhbj/?view_only=e1e725ae1ee14d7495b024dded82a53a).
9

2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
I recruited 448 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants in the U.S.1 from
Prime panels (Litman et al., 2017). I recruited White people because White Christians are more
concerned about bias against their group than non-White Christians (Jones et al., 2017;
Vandermaas-Peeler et al., 2018). I excluded 86 participants from analyses who failed an attention
check or who incorrectly answered at least one of two multiple choice questions about their
assigned bias paragraph (consistent with the preregistered exclusion criteria). I report data for
362 participants (62.2% Female, 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 52.97, SD = 15.51). No participants guessed the study
hypotheses.

2.1.2 Procedure
Participants were led to believe they were taking part in two separate experiments. The
first was described as testing memory of an article (assessed directly after reading and again after
completing a second study). The “second study” was described as assessing social opinions.
Participants were randomly assigned into one of two conditions in which they either read an
excerpt about anti-Christian bias in America (e.g., “in recent years Christians have reported
increased experiences of persecution and discrimination.”) or a control condition excerpt
describing anti-Inuit bias in Canada (McCoy & Major, 2007). After completing an attention
check, participants completed the following measures.

1

In my first two experiments, I indicated to Prime Panels to only recruit participants in the U.S.
However, I failed to include a demographic question in my surveys to confirm they were living
in the U.S.
10

2.1.3 Measures
All measures were completed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale
unless otherwise indicated.
Feeling Thermometers assessed attitudes toward “Gay or lesbian people”, “Transgender
people”, “Blacks”, “Atheists”, “Muslims”, “Jews”, “Hindus”, “Agnostics”, and “Christians”.
Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (Very cold or unfavorable feeling) and 100 (Very warm
or favorable feeling). I included Hindus because I was interested in whether attitudes toward
Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic groups would resemble each other.
I measured Religiosity with a single item: “How religious are you?”. Religiosity was
anchored at 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Very religious).
Christian ID was adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) importance to identity
subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., “My religion is an important reflection of who
I am”).
Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check consisted of five items adapted from Wilkins
et al. (2021) (e.g., “Discrimination against Christians is on the rise”).
Traditionalism was measured with 11 items from Duckitt et al’s., (2010) Traditionalism
scale (e.g., “The ‘old-fashioned ways’ and ‘old-fashioned values’ still show the best way to
live.”).2
Political Orientation was assessed with a single item: “In general, do you think of
yourself as ______?”. The item was anchored at 1 (Very Liberal) and 7 (Very Conservative). The
midpoint of the scale was labeled Moderate.

2 In all experiments measuring traditionalism, I left out the item concerning nudist camps
because I thought they were less relevant for a US sample.
11

2.2 Results and Discussion
2.2.1 Analysis Strategy
I conducted independent samples t-tests to assess the effect of condition on the dependent
variables. See Table 2.1 for independent samples t-test results.
Table 2.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 1. Compares Anti-Christian Bias
Condition and Control Condition.

Variables

Anti-Christian
Bias (N = 187 to
191)
M (SD)
54.62 (31.73)

Control (N =
168 to 171)
M (SD)

t

p

95%CI

62.99 (30.15)

-2.56

.011

-14.80, -1.94

Transgender people FT

47.62 (33.50)

56.38 (31.00)

-2.56

.011

-15.49, -2.02

Blacks FT

76.24 (22.81)

77.33 (22.67)

-.45

.650

-5.80, 3.62

Atheists FT

51.12 (31.60)

57.71 (31.68)

-1.96

.051†

-13.20, .02

Muslims FT

52.27 (31.90)

57.08 (30.74)

-1.45

.148

-11.34, 1.72

Jews FT

75.45 (23.35)

77.95 (21.37)

-1.06

.292

-7.15, 2.16

Hindus FT

63.12 (29.78)

65.87 (27.08)

-.91

.365

-8.70, 3.20

Agnostics FT

55.10 (30.49)

62.03 (28.32)

-2.21

.028

-13.09, -.76

Christians FT

86.07 (18.37)

86.53 (15.45)

-.26

.799

-3.99, 3.07

Christian ID

4.79 (1.65)

4.64 (1.61)

.89

.373

-.18, .49

Traditionalism

4.78 (1.23)

4.55 (1.26)

1.73

.085

-.03, .48

Religiosity

4.69 (1.66)

4.53 (1.59)

.95

.342

-.17, .50

Gay or lesbian people
Feeling Thermometer
(FT)

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.
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2.2.2 Condition Differences
The anti-Christian bias manipulation check successfully differed by condition.
Participants in the anti-Christian bias condition (M = 4.70, SD= 1.29) perceived greater bias
against their group than those in the control condition, (M = 4.12, SD = 1.29), t(360) = 4.22, p <
.001; 95%CI: [0.30, 0.84].
Christians in the anti-Christian bias condition reported colder evaluations of agnostics
and atheists (p = .051) than those in the control condition. Attitudes toward religious groups
(including Christians) did not differ by condition. This is consistent with the perspective that
some Christians may see similarities between Christianity and other religions. It is also possible
that when Christians read about bias against Christians in America, they may also think that
Americans are biased against religious people in general. As a result, some Christians may
perceive solidarity between their group and other religious groups and prejudice against these
other religious groups may decrease as a result of the perceived commonality (see Gaertner et al.,
1993).
Importantly, Christians who read about anti-Christian bias also reported colder attitudes
toward gay or lesbian people, as predicted, and toward transgender people. This suggests that
both gay and transgender targets are perceived as posing a threat to Christians who are concerned
about bias against their group. Thus, my hypotheses regarding attitudes toward gay or lesbian
people were supported. Moreover, the effect of the anti-Christian bias manipulation on attitudes
toward transgender people provides initial evidence that transgender people too are perceived as
violating Christian values.

13

However, I did not measure symbolic threat, so I am unable to detect whether concern
about values (symbolic threat) contributed toward the increase in prejudice toward gay and
transgender people and toward atheists and agnostics.3

I also predicted that participants who read about anti-Christian bias would report higher
religiosity, and Christian ID than those assigned to the control condition. These predictions,
while less central to my primary focus of intergroup attitudes, follow from the rejection
identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999; Ramos et al., 2012) which posits increased
ingroup identification after experiencing discrimination. We also predicted that participants in
the anti-Christian bias condition would report increased endorsement of traditional values than
those in the control condition to replicate findings in a pilot study. Previous research also found
increased conservativism for Whites following status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014), and
conservativism is associated with traditionalism (Duckitt et al., 2010). Contrary to hypotheses,
participants in the anti-Christian bias condition did not report higher religiosity or perceived
Christian ID than those in the control condition. Participants in the experimental group reported
marginally more endorsement of traditional values than the control group did, however.
3

14

Chapter 3: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, I manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias and measured attitudes
toward target groups as in Experiment 1. However, I also measured Christians’ symbolic threat
and the extent to which they perceive each target group as having influence in American culture
and society. This design allowed me to test three aims. First, I attempted to replicate the effect of
anti-Christian bias on prejudice toward gay or lesbian people, transgender people, atheists, and
agnostics from Experiment 1. Second, it allowed me to test whether these effects could be
explained by an increase in symbolic threat that results from the manipulation of anti-Christian
bias. My third aim was to provide evidence that prejudice toward groups is exacerbated the more
those groups are perceived as influential.
Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered hypotheses, planned
analyses, and exclusion criteria are posted on OSF
(https://osf.io/7da8p/?view_only=6f6e034cb42142a4bb54b3993046628c). Deviations from
planned analyses are noted.

3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
I recruited 617 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants from Prime panels
(Litman et al., 2017). I then dropped 119 participants who failed an attention check or who
incorrectly answered a multiple-choice reading comprehension question about their assigned
paragraph. I report data for 498 participants (68.5% Female, 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 48.62, SD = 15.90).

15

3.1.2 Procedure
Participants were led to believe they were taking part in two separate experiments, one to
test memory of an article directly after reading it and also after completing a second study.
Participants were randomly assigned to read about bias against Christians in America in the antiChristian bias condition or about bias against Inuit in Canada (McCoy & Major, 2007) in the
control condition.1 The anti-Christian bias paragraph was slightly different from that used in
Experiment 1; it was longer and included concrete examples of ways Christians report facing
bias in America and of material consequences that result from said bias (e.g., “a majority of
professors have reported they would feel uneasy about accepting a devout Christian to their
graduate programs”). I implemented these changes because I thought including examples would
increase the persuasiveness of the manipulation. After completing two reading comprehension
questions, participants completed the following measures.

3.1.3 Measures
All measures were completed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree)
scale unless otherwise indicated. Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, supplemental
analyses, and preregistered hypotheses are posted on OSF
(https://osf.io/7zmbc/?view_only=1f05c707bef848809c9636e0a1da2a8e).

1

Some participants were assigned into a third condition which featured a passage detailing how
the number of Christians in America has decreased over time. Because this condition did not
manipulate perceptions of anti-Christian bias, I do not report it in this paper. Furthermore,
participants assigned to this demographic shift condition did not differ from the control condition
on the anti-Christian bias manipulation check. Because I are not reporting the third condition, I
report independent samples t-tests to replicate Experiment 1 rather than the preregistered oneway ANOVAS with planned simple effect analyses. These participants are not included in
analyses or within the “Participants” header.
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Feeling Thermometers for and perceived Group Influence of “Gay and lesbian
people”, “Transgender people”, “Atheists”, “Agnostics”, “Blacks”, “Muslims”, “Jews”, and
“Christians”. Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (Very cold or unfavorable feeling) and
100 (Very warm or favorable feeling). Perceived Group Influence was measured with three
items (e.g., “_________ heavily influence culture in America”), anchored normally.
Six Symbolic Threat (e.g., “I am worried that people in America don’t respect Christian
values”) and six Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check (e.g., “Discrimination against
Christians is on the rise in the US”) items were adapted from Wilkins et al. (2021).
Political Orientation and Religiosity were measured as in Experiment 1.

3.2 Results and Discussion
3.2.1 Condition Differences
To replicate Experiment 1, I first report independent samples t-tests. See Table 3.1 for
independent samples t-test results.
Table 3.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 2. Compares Anti-Christian Bias
Condition and Control Condition.

Variables

Anti-Christian Bias Control (N =
(N = 237 to 248
227 to 250)
M (SD)
M (SD)

t

p

95%CI

Anti-Christian Bias

4.78 (1.37)

4.18 (1.40)

4.88

<.001

.36, .85

Symbolic Threat

4.61 (1.38)

4.36 (1.30)

2.09

.037

.02, .49

Religiosity

5.05 (1.51)

4.92 (1.65)

.94

.350

-.15, .41

Manipulation Check

Feeling
Thermometers
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Gay and lesbian people

53.71 (29.44)

58.73 (29.32)

-1.88

.060†

-10.25, .22

Transgender people

42.02 (28.61)

48.45 (29.77)

-2.39

.017

-11.72, -1.14

Blacks

74.69 (21.94)

75.12 (23.19)

-.21

.834

-4.48, 3.61

Atheists

39.88 (27.25)

42.50 (27.34)

-1.04

.301

-7.60, 2.35

Agnostics

44.31 (26.38)

44.65 (25.28)

-.14

.887

-5.03, 4.35

Muslims

45.96 (30.08)

51.91 (28.90)

-2.20

.028

-11.27, -.63

Jews

71.98 (23.27)

72.92 (23.91)

-.43

.665

-5.16, 3.30

Christians

86.33 (18.01)

85.57 (18.30)

.46

.646

-2.49, 4.01

Gay and lesbian people

4.50 (1.36)

4.26 (1.42)

1.95

.052†

-.00, .49

Transgender people

3.48 (1.47)

3.44 (1.53)

.31

.760

-.22, .31

Blacks

5.21 (1.12)

5.29 (1.37)

-.71

.477

-.30, .14

Atheists

3.48 (1.54)

3.16 (1.61)

2.24

.025

.04, .59

Agnostics

3.35 (1.34)

3.30 (1.49)

.40

.689

-.20, .30

Muslims

3.33 (1.39)

3.55 (1.60)

-1.66

.098†

-.49, .04

Jews

4.27 (1.49)

4.51 (1.45)

-1.81

.071†

-.50, .02

Christians

4.90 (1.45)

5.59 (1.29)

-5.60

<.001

-.93, -.45

Group Influence

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.
Perceptions of anti-Christian bias differed by condition, such that participants in the antiChristian bias condition perceived more bias against Christians than those in the control
condition. This suggests perceptions of anti-Christian bias were successfully manipulated.
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Christians in the anti-Christian bias condition also reported greater symbolic threat than
those in the control condition. Relatedly, Christians were also perceived as less influential in the
anti-Christian bias condition than in the control condition. This suggests that perceiving bias
against Christians increases concern about one’s values and beliefs.
Although not hypothesized, Jews and Muslims were both perceived as marginally less
influential in the experimental condition than in the control condition. Conversely, atheists were
perceived as more influential in the anti-Christian bias condition than in the control condition.
This suggests that Christians may perceive anti-Christian bias as evidence that religion (or
perhaps just Abrahamic religions) more generally is not faring well in America. Gay and lesbian
people, but not transgender people, were perceived as marginally more influential by Christians
exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation than those in the control condition. Because gay
and Christian values are perceived as being at odds (Herek, 1988), perhaps depressed Christian
influence in the U.S. suggests that gay people are able to exert more influence over the country.
Contrary to my findings from Experiment 1, warmth toward atheists and agnostics did
not differ by condition. Unlike in Experiment 1, warmth toward Muslims did differ by condition;
participants in the anti-Christian-bias condition reported less warmth toward Muslims than those
in the control condition. The latter effect is less surprising though given the increased power; the
mean difference for the Muslims feeling thermometer was similar in both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2.
Consistent with Experiment 1 and hypotheses, participants in the anti-Christian bias
condition reported less warmth toward transgender people and marginally less warmth toward
gay or lesbian people. Because the effect of anti-Christian bias on gay and lesbian and
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transgender people was consistent between experiments and because I am most interested in gay
and transgender targets, I will focus on these outcomes to test my remaining aims.

3.2.2 Symbolic Threat Mediates Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on Prejudice
Toward Gay and Lesbian People and Transgender People
To test whether the effect of anti-Christian bias (anti-Christian bias=1, control=0) on
anti-gay and anti-transgender attitudes is mediated by symbolic threat, I used Hayes Process
MACRO Model 4. Indirect effect confidence intervals were calculated using 5,000 bootstraps.
I first tested mediation with the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer as the
outcome. The overall model was significant, F(2, 467) = 32.15, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .12. Condition
significantly predicted symbolic threat, b = .26, p = .031, and symbolic threat significantly
predicted the feeling thermometer, b = -7.27, p < .0001. Importantly, symbolic threat
significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the gay or lesbian people feeling
thermometer; the indirect effect was significant = -1.91, 95%CI: [-3.70, -.13]. See Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Symbolic Threat Mediation for the Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer.
Symbolic Threat Mediates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and
Warmth.
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I then repeated the process with the transgender people feeling thermometer substituted
in. The overall model was significant, F(2, 467) = 52.18, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .18. Condition
marginally predicted symbolic threat, b = .22, p = .075, and symbolic threat significantly
predicted the feeling thermometer, b = -8.97, p < .0001. Symbolic threat marginally mediated the
relationship between condition and the transgender people feeling thermometer; the indirect
effect was marginally significant = -2.00, 95%CI: [-4.20, 0.24]. See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Symbolic Threat Mediation for the Transgender People Feeling
Thermometer. Symbolic Threat Marginally Mediates the Relationship Between Perceiving AntiChristian Bias and Warmth.

3.2.3 Target Group Influence Moderates Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on
Prejudice Toward Gay and Lesbian People and Transgender People
I ran a regression with the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer as the outcome and
with condition (anti-Christian bias=1, control=0), mean-centered gay or lesbian people
influence, and the interaction term as predictors. The overall model was significant F(3, 483) =
57.91, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .21. At mean levels of group influence, warmth toward Gay and lesbian
people was significantly lower in the anti-Christian bias condition than in the control condition,
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b = -6.82, p = .005. Perceived influence of gay or lesbian people was positively related to
warmth for the control condition, b = 11.78, p < .0001. The interaction term was significant, b =
-5.24, p = .003.
Importantly, endpoint analyses revealed that at one standard deviation above the group
influence mean, the effect of condition became even larger, b = -14.07, p < .0001. At one
standard deviation below the group influence mean, however, the effect of condition was
nonsignificant, b = .43, p = .899. See Figure 3.3.2
Figure 3.3: Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer by Condition and Influence. Influence
Moderates the Effect of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias on Warmth.
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Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Table 3.1 shows that perceived influence of Gay and lesbian people marginally differed by
condition. Given that there are limitations in interpreting interactions when the moderator differs
by condition, it is important to note that the two analyses use slightly different samples; the
regression can only use participants who reported both the perceived influence questions AND
the feeling thermometer. Of Christians included in the regression analysis, the anti-Christian
bias (M = 4.49, SD = 1.36) and control (M = 4.29, SD = 1.40) conditions did not differ in
perceived group influence of gay and lesbian people, t(485) = 1.57, p = .117; 95%CI: [-.05, .44].
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I then ran a regression with the transgender people feeling thermometer as the outcome
and with condition (anti-Christian bias=1, control=0), mean-centered transgender people
influence, and the interaction term as predictors. The overall model was significant F(3, 466) =
32.38, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .18. At mean levels of group influence, warmth toward transgender
people was significantly lower in the anti-Christian bias condition than in the control condition,
b = -6.60, p = .008. Perceived influence of transgender people was positively related to warmth
for participants in the control condition, b = 10.03, p < .0001. The interaction term was
significant, b = -4.35, p = .009.
At one standard deviation above the group influence mean, the effect of condition
became even larger, b = -13.02, p = .0002. At one standard deviation below the group influence
mean, however, the effect of condition was nonsignificant, b = -.19, p = .957. See Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Transgender People Feeling Thermometer by Condition and Influence. Influence
Moderates the Effect of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias on Warmth.
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Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

23

These regressions suggest that perceiving anti-Christian bias only results in an increase in
anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice (relative to a control) when Christians perceive these
groups as being relatively influential. Moreover, the effect of anti-Christian bias increases with
gay and transgender people’s perceived influence.

3.2.4 Does Group Influence Moderate the Relationship Between AntiChristian Bias and Symbolic Threat or Symbolic Threat and Group Attitudes
I previously used separate models to test whether symbolic threat mediated the
relationship between perceiving anti-Christian bias and anti-gay and anti-transgender bias and
whether group influence moderated that relationship. However, this approach does not test
whether group influence moderates the indirect effect of symbolic threat. I used Hayes Process
MACRO Model 8 to test whether perceived group influence moderates the relationship between
condition (anti-Christian bias=1, control=0) and symbolic threat. Model 8 also tests whether
perceived group influence moderates the direct effect of condition on group attitudes. Indirect
effect confidence intervals were calculated using 5,000 bootstraps and continuous variables were
mean-centered.
I first tested whether gay or lesbian people influence moderates the direct and indirect
effects of condition on anti-gay attitudes. See Figure 3.5 for the model being tested.
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Figure 3.5: Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer Moderated Mediation Model.
Influence Moderating Direct and Indirect Effects is Tested.

The overall model predicting the mediator, symbolic threat, was significant, F(3, 483) =
3.59, p = .014, 𝑅 2 = .02. Condition significantly predicted symbolic threat, b = .26, p = .030. Gay
or lesbian people influence marginally predicted symbolic threat, b = -.12, p = .062. The
interaction between condition and influence was significant, b = .22, p = .014. See Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Symbolic Threat by Condition and Gay and Lesbian People Influence. Influence
Moderates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Symbolic Threat.
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Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
The overall model predicting the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer condition,
gay or lesbian people influence, the interaction term, and symbolic threat was significant F(4,
482) = 53.61, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .31. Symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling
thermometer, b = -6.97, p < .0001. Condition significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, b =
-4.98, p = .027. Gay and lesbian people influence also predicted the feeling thermometer, b
=10.98, p < .0001. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between condition and
influence, b = -3.73, p = .022. This suggests that influence exacerbates the negative effect of
perceiving anti-Christian bias even after accounting for symbolic threat.
Symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the gay or
lesbian people feeling thermometer at mean (indirect effect = -1.84, 95%CI: [-3.61, -.15]) and
high-levels (+1 standard deviation; indirect effect = -3.93, 95%CI: [-6.82, -1.36]) of perceived
group influence but not at low levels of perceived group influence (indirect effect = .24, 95%CI:
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[-2.17, 2.71]). The index of moderated mediation was significant = -1.51, 95%CI: [-3.00, -.14],
meaning that the indirect effect of symbolic threat on attitudes toward gay and lesbian people
was more negative the more influential gay and lesbian people were perceived to be.
I then tested whether transgender people influence moderates the direct and indirect
effects of condition on anti-transgender attitudes. See Figure 3.7 for the model being tested.
Figure 3.7: Transgender People Feeling Thermometer Moderated Mediation Model.
Influence Moderating Direct and Indirect Effects is Tested.

The overall model predicting the mediator, symbolic threat, was significant, F(3, 466) =
2.94, p = .033, 𝑅 2 = .02. Condition marginally predicted symbolic threat, b = .22, p = .073.
transgender people influence significantly predicted symbolic threat, b = -.14, p = .023. The
interaction between condition and influence was significant, b = .17, p = .042. See Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Symbolic Threat by Condition and Transgender People Influence. Influence
Moderates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Symbolic Threat.
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Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
The overall model predicting the transgender people feeling thermometer condition,
transgender people influence, the interaction term, and symbolic threat was significant F(4, 465)
= 56.75, p < .0001, 𝑅 2 = .33. Symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, b
= -8.37, p < .0001. Condition significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, b = -4.73, p = .035.
transgender people influence also predicted the feeling thermometer, b =8.90, p < .0001. There
was a marginally significant interaction between condition and influence, b = -2.91, p = .056.
Symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the
transgender people feeling thermometer at high-levels (+1 standard deviation; indirect effect = 4.00, 95%CI: [-7.22, -.81]) and marginally mediated the relationship at mean-levels (indirect
effect = -1.87, 90%CI: [-3.56, -.15]) of perceived group influence but not at low levels of
perceived group influence (indirect effect = .25, 95%CI: [-2.76, 3.28]). The index of moderated
mediation was marginally significant = -1.44, 90%CI: [-2.76, -.17], meaning that the indirect
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effect of symbolic threat on attitudes toward transgender people was marginally more negative
the more influential transgender people perceived to be.
To reiterate, I argue that perceiving anti-Christian bias increases concern about Christian
values which corresponds to prejudice toward groups seen as having conflicting values.
Symbolic threat mediating the relationship between anti-Christian bias and anti-gay and
(marginally between) anti-transgender attitudes provides initial support for my proposed model.
Furthermore, I proposed that if concern about values and beliefs drives prejudice, then that
increase in prejudice should be starkest when a group is perceived as having enough influence to
properly espouse conflicting beliefs and values. I again find support for this premise; target
group influence moderated the relationship between condition and warmth toward both gay and
lesbian people and transgender people. At relatively higher (but not lower) levels of group
influence, the effect of anti-Christian bias resulted in decreased warmth toward the target groups.
Finally, these contentions are again supported when tested in the same model. However,
influence was merely measured in this experiment. Thus, the relationship between anti-Christian
bias and influence may be better explained by a confounding variable I neglected to measure.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3
After examining prejudice toward groups as a whole in Experiments 1 and 2, in
Experiment 3, I tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias increases discrimination toward
individuals. Specifically, I examined attitudes toward a purported gay applicant for an editor
position. Hence, I examined consequences that may have implications for real-world hiring of
LGBT people. Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of perceiving anti-Christian
bias on anti-gay prejudice, Experiment 3 provides insight into how this prejudice may
materialize into discriminatory treatment.
Additionally, I also manipulated the influence of the editor position, allowing me to
measure whether threatened Christians are resistant to the idea of hiring a gay applicant for
influential positions. This allows me to gain additional evidence on the causal role of influence in
my proposed model.
I first manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias (as in Experiments 1 and 2) and
subsequently had Christians evaluate a gay man’s resume for an editor job that (1) either had
influence over published content or (2) had no influence over content. I predicted that Christians
who were exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation would evaluate a gay applicant as less
worthy of hire than those in the control condition. I also predicted that this effect of perceiving
anti-Christian bias on perceived hirability would be stronger for participants who read about an
influential editor (as compared to one with little control over content).
Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered exclusion criteria,
hypotheses, and planned analyses are posted on OSF
(https://osf.io/m62st/?view_only=f347a4dd53124415a1ea9cd80bf21a3f). Deviations from
planned analyses will be noted.
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4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
I recruited 1,084 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants living in the
United States from Prime panels (Litman et al., 2017). Aligned with preregistered exclusion
criteria, I dropped 387 participants who failed a general attention check, who incorrectly
answered at least one of two multiple choice questions about their assigned bias paragraph, who
failed a manipulation attention check and those who provided nonsensical summaries of the bias
paragraph or provided no summary at all. After these exclusions, 697 participants (69.9%
Female, 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 57.22, SD = 15.29) remained.1

4.1.2 Procedure
Participants were led to believe they were taking part in three separate and unrelated
experiments: one to test memory of an article, one examining hiring practices, and one about
their opinions on various issues. To increase salience of the article throughout, they were told
that their memory of the article would be tested immediately after reading it and after completing
the second study. Participants were then randomly assigned into either the anti-Christian bias
condition or the control condition as in Experiment 1 (McCoy & Major, 2007). I used the
manipulation of anti-Christian bias from Experiment 1 rather than the manipulation from
Experiment 2 because I thought the manipulation focused too heavily on realistic rather than
symbolic consequences of anti-Christian bias. Moreover, the manipulation in Experiment 2

1

Because my analyses and interpretation depended on participants reading the bias paragraphs,
understanding the editor’s influence over article content, and the applicant’s sexuality, I had to
remove a large portion of my sample. Patterns remain the same when including participants
removed for missing the non-demographic attention checks, and significance is often unchanged.
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contained examples of anti-Christian bias that were fabricated for the purpose of the experiment,
so the manipulation was less related to real-world reports of anti-Christian bias.
The “second study” tasked participants with reading a job description for an editor
position at a widely-read university newspaper. The specific job duties of the editor were
manipulated. Participants were either assigned into (1) the content influence condition and read
about an editor position that will have control over content (e.g., being able to assign article
topics and elsewise approving or denying article topics that the writers come up with) or
participants were assigned to (2) the no content influence condition and read about an editor
position with no control over content (e.g., dealing primarily with grammar, syntax, or factual
errors). Participants evaluated a resume of a gay, male applicant for the assigned editor position.2
Participants then completed the primary dependent variables; they rated the applicant’s
hireability. Participants then completed the remaining measures described below as part of
“study three”.

4.1.3 Measures
All measures were completed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale
unless otherwise indicated.
Hirability was assessed with 5 items (e.g., “If you were hiring for this position, how
likely would you be to hire Jack for this position?” anchored at 1 (Very unlikely) and 7 (Very
likely) and “Jack is unlikely to succeed in this position” (reverse scored)).

2

The applicant was described as being president of the Gay-Straight Alliance club at the
University and purportedly wrote a guide on coming out as gay to family members.
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Because I did not think I could manipulate influence without inadvertently manipulating
a job’s prestige, I measured job prestige with one item (“This position is prestigious”) to employ
as a covariate in analyses.
Feeling Thermometers for “Gay or lesbian people”, “Transgender people”, “African
Americans”, “Atheists”, “Muslims”, “Jews”, “Hindus”, “Agnostics”, “Christians”, and “Asian
Americans” were measured. Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (Very cold or unfavorable
feeling) and 100 (Very warm or favorable feeling).
I measured an Editor Influence Manipulation Check (e.g., “The person who is hired for
this position will have the ability to influence the opinions of others” and “The person holding
this position can spread their values to readers”).
Six Symbolic Threat (e.g., “I am worried that people in America don’t respect Christian
values”), six Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check (e.g., “Discrimination against
Christians is on the rise in the US”), six Realistic Threat (e.g., “I worry that certain job options
will be blocked to Christians who refuse to compromise their morals”), and four Mutual
Exclusivity of Christians and LGBT people (e.g., “LGBT people can’t be good Christians”),
items were used from Wilkins et al. (2021) The latter two measures were included for
exploratory purposes.
Traditionalism, Political Orientation, and Religiosity was measured as in Experiment
1.

4.2 Results and Discussion
4.2.1 Manipulation Checks
Perceptions of bias against Christians in America significantly differed between the bias
conditions, t(695) = 4.49, p < .001; 95%CI: [0.31, 0.79], such that participants in the anti33

Christian bias condition (M = 4.60, SD= 1.56) perceived significantly more anti-Christian bias
than those in the control condition, (M = 4.05, SD = 1.67). Thus, the manipulation worked as
intended.
Perceived influence of the editor position also differed between the editor type
conditions, t(695) = 19.30, p < .001; 95%CI: [1.77, 2.18); participants in the content influence
condition (M = 5.50, SD= 1.08) perceived the position as being more influential than those in the
no content influence condition, (M = 3.52, SD = 1.58). Thus, both of the manipulation worked as
intended.

4.2.2 Does the Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on Perceived Hirability Depend on
Job Influence?
I ran a 2 (Bias: Anti-Christian vs. Anti-Inuit) x 2 (Editor Type: content influence vs. no
content influence) ANCOVA for hirability. As preregistered, I include prestige as a covariate
because participants who read about the editor with content influence (M = 5.13, SD = 1.18)
perceived the position as being more prestigious than those who read about an uninfluential
editor (M = 4.39, SD = 1.38), t(694) = 7.57, p < .001; 95%CI: [0.55, 0..93]. My reasoning for its
inclusion is to sidestep the potential confound that it is prestige (or potential covariates of
prestige like job desirability or higher salary) rather than influence that interacts with bias.
Additionally, because people likely hold higher expectations for people applying to prestigious
rather than non-prestigious jobs, controlling for prestige helps eliminate unwanted variance in
perceived qualifications needed for jobs of varying prestige.
Prestige was a significant covariate, F(1, 691) = 17.99, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝2 = .03.
Contrary to my predictions, the main effect of bias was nonsignificant, F(1, 691) = 0.00,
p = .979, 𝑛𝑝2 = .00; hirability did not differ between the anti-Christian bias condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 =
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4.87, SE = 0.07) and the control condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.87, SE = 0.06), p = .979, 95%CI: [-.18,
.18].3 Because this experiment conceptually replicates Experiment 1 and 2, I predicted that
Christians assigned to the anti-Christian bias condition would report harsher evaluations of the
gay applicant than their control counterparts. Perhaps I did not detect an effect of bias because I
measured attitudes toward an individual target rather than a target group; participants may be
more inclined to believe a group tends to hold values that conflict with their own as opposed to
believing an individual will hold such values. For example, individual targets are evaluated more
favorably than the groups the targets belong to (Sears, 1983), and if Christians perceive
conflicting values as immoral or unfavorable, they may be less likely to presume an individual
holds these attitudes.
The main effect of editor type was similarly nonsignificant, F(1, 691) = 1.24, p = .266,
𝑛𝑝2 = .00; hirability did not differ between the content influence condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.81, SE =
0.07) and the no content influence (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.92, SE = 0.07), p = .266, 95%CI: [-.29, .08]. As
predicted, there was a significant interaction between bias and editor type was significant, F(1,
691) = 5.50, p = .019, 𝑛𝑝2 = .01.
Simple effects revealed that Christians in the Anti-Christian Bias condition perceived the
applicant as less hirable in the content influence condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.71, SE = 0.10) than those in
the no content influence condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 5.03, SE = 0.09), F(1, 691) = 5.58, p = .018, 𝑛𝑝2 = .01,

3

I also predicted that the effect of the anti-Christian bias manipulation would increase symbolic
threat which would decrease participant’s perceived hirability of the gay applicant. Moreover, I
also predicted that the negative association between symbolic threat and perceived hirability
would be stronger for those who read that the editor will have influence than those who read that
the editor will not have influence. Because the manipulation of anti-Christian bias did not result
in a significant decrease in perceived hirability (regardless of whether the job was described as
influential or not), it does not make sense to test whether the unobserved effect was driven by
symbolic threat.
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95%CI: [-.59, -.05]. Participants in the control condition did not differ in hirability between the
content influence condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.92, SE = 0.09) than those in the no content influence
condition (𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 4.81, SE = 0.10), F(1, 691) = 0.72, p = .395, 𝑛𝑝2 = .001, 95%CI: [-.14, .36].
Thus, influence only affects attitudes when Christians were experimentally threatened;
threatened Christians only are disinclined to perceive the gay applicant as hirable.
As predicted, participants in the content influence condition perceived the applicant as
marginally less hirable in the anti-Christian bias condition than in the control conditions, F(1,
691) = 2.76, p = .097, 𝑛𝑝2 = .004, 95%CI: [-.47, .04]. Curiously, though, participants in the no
content influence condition perceived the applicant as marginally more hirable in the antiChristian bias condition than in the control conditions, F(1, 691) = 2.76, p = .097, 𝑛𝑝2 = .004,
95%CI: [-.04, .48]. See Figure 4.1
Figure 4.1: Hirability by Factors Controlling for Prestige. Perceived Hirability of a Gay
Applicant is Predicted by Perceptions of Anti-Christian Bias and Position Influence.

5.2
5.1
5

Hirability

4.9
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No Content Influence
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Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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4.2.3 Experiment 1 Replications
I conducted independent samples t-tests in an attempt to replicate the results from
Experiment 1. Contrary to previous experiments, I observed no effect of the manipulation on any
of the feeling thermometers. There may have been too many tasks between the manipulation and
the feeling thermometers for the manipulation to have been fully salient. See Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 3. Compares Anti-Christian Bias
Condition and Control Condition.

Variables

Anti-Christian Bias Control (N =
(N = 332 to 334)
358 to 363)
M (SD)
M (SD)

t

p

95%CI

Gay or lesbian people
Feeling Thermometer
(FT)

64.01 (30.58)

65.28 (30.15)

-.55

.582

-5.80, 3.26

Transgender people FT

57.07 (31.98)

57.56 (31.79)

-.20

.841

-5.26, 4.28

African Americans FT

79.46 (22.20)

77.91 (21.64)

.93

.351

-1.71, 4.81

Atheists FT

50.48 (31.93)

52.82 (32.64)

-.95

.341

-7.17, 2.48

Muslims FT

59.54 (30.46)

58.13 (30.72)

.61

.544

-3.15, 5.97

Jews FT

79.10 (21.39)

79.81 (20.64)

-.45

.653

-3.85, 2.41

Hindus FT

66.94 (27.80)

67.20 (27.24)

-.12

.901

-4.37, 3.85

Agnostics FT

57.95 (30.20)

59.78 (30.65)

-.79

.430

-6.38, 2.72

Christians FT

88.06 (16.20)

87.57 (14.54)

.43

.671

-1.80, 2.79

Asian Americans FT

79.09 (21.95)

79.94 (20.40)

-.53

.597

-4.01, 2.31

Symbolic Threat

4.52 (1.47)

4.11 (1.69)

4.36

.001

.17, .65

Realistic Threat

4.20 (1.53)

3.86 (1.72)

3.36

.006

.10, .58
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Traditionalism

4.81 (1.37)

4.63 (1.37)

1.87

.095†

-.03, .38

Religiosity

5.08 (1.60)

4.96 (1.61)

1.19

.233

-.11, .37

Mutual Exclusivity

2.93 (2.01)

2.84 (1.97)

.60

.551

-.21, .39

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.
Overall, Experiment 3 provides evidence that influence plays a causal role in
discrimination against a gay target when anti-Christian bias is salient. Christians who read about
bias against their group and an influential position reported the applicant as being less hirable
than an otherwise comparable group who read that the position would wield no influence. That
there was no effect of Editor Type for participants in the control condition suggests that only
threatened Christians are relatively opposed to hiring a gay person for an influential position.
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
In this paper, I tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias increases prejudice toward
LGT people and whether that prejudice is driven by symbolic threat and is moderated by group
influence. Specifically, I tested whether the increase in prejudice would be starkest under high
levels of influence because greater influence exacerbates the effect of perceiving anti-Christian
bias on symbolic threat and allows groups to spread values perceived of as conflicting with
Christians’.
In Experiments 1 and 2, Christians assigned to the anti-Christian bias condition reported
more negative attitudes toward LGT people than those in the control condition. These effects did
not replicate in Experiment 3: likely due to different methods (i.e., more time elapsed between
the manipulation and feeling thermometers and no measure of group influence to test for
moderation).
Experiments 2 and 3 provide evidence that perceived influence of gay and transgender
people moderates the relationship between perceiving anti-Christian bias, symbolic threat, and
attitudes toward gay and lesbian and transgender people. First, Experiment 2 provided statistical
evidence that the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on anti-gay and anti-transgender
prejudice is driven by symbolic threat. In Experiment 2 the effect of anti-Christian bias on antigay and anti-transgender prejudice only occurred (relative to control) when these target groups
were perceived as relatively influential, increasing the more the groups were perceived as
influential. When influence and symbolic threat were included in the same models, gay and
lesbian and transgender people’s influence moderated the effect of the anti-Christian bias
manipulation on symbolic threat; symbolic threat increased to a greater extent from the
manipulation the more influential these groups were perceived to be, and this led to increased
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prejudice against transgender (marginally significant indirect effect) and gay and lesbian people.
Experiment 3 revealed a causal role of influence: Christians assigned to the anti-Christian bias
condition perceived a gay applicant as less hirable when they were led to believe the job was a
high rather than low influence position. Thus, we found evidence, with varying methodologies,
that perceiving anti-Christian bias leads to prejudice toward transgender and especially gay
people because of symbolic threat and as a function of perceived influence.

5.1 Does Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias Cause Prejudice Against Other
Groups?
Although LGT targets were the primary focus of this work, I theorized that perceiving
anti-Christian bias would cause prejudice against other groups perceived of as violating Christian
values. Because significance of results for atheists, agnostics, and Muslims was inconsistent
between Experiments, I conducted a mega analysis (see Eisenhauer, 2021) which combined all
data from a pilot experiments and the three experiments reported here.1 I conducted independent
samples t-tests with the combined data by using attitudes toward groups as separate dependent
variables and with condition as the grouping variable. See Table 5.1.2

1 The pilot experiment manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias as in Experiment 1 to test
the effectiveness of the manipulation. The same exclusion criteria was used as in Experiment 1.
Materials and data are posted at
https://osf.io/2hgd9/?view_only=8b2a2203beff4ccd9024847d04c7f02d.
2
The effect of anti-Christian bias on attitudes toward Muslims becomes marginally significant (p
= .052) when excluding pilot data. Significance and directionality is otherwise unchanged when
excluding pilot data.
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Table 5.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Combined Experiments. Compares Anti-Christian
Bias Condition and Control Condition.

Variables

Anti-Christian
Bias

Control

t

df

p

95%CI

M (SD)

M (SD)
Gay or lesbian
people Feeling
Thermometer (FT)

58.21 (30.93)

62.84 (30.14)

-3.22 1803

.001

-7.45, -1.81

Transgender people
FT

50.33 (31.74)

54.94 (31.50)

-3.08 1777

.002

-7.55, -1.67

Atheists FT

47.10 (31.03)

51.21 (31.52)

-2.77 1773

.006

-7.02, -1.20

Muslims FT

53.27 (31.22)

56.23 (30.54)

-2.03 1685

.043

-5.82, -.09

Jews FT

75.99 (22.86)

77.37 (22.50)

-1.29 1786

.196

-3.48, .71

Blacks FT

77.51 (22.37)

77.41 (22.44)

.09

1799

.931

-1.98, 2.16

Hindus FT

64.38 (29.16)

66.10 (27.58)

-1.07 1220

.287

-4.91, 1.46

Agnostics FT

52.55 (29.86)

55.63 (29.63)

-2.13 1803

.034

-5.92, -.24

Christians FT

87.36 (17.11)

86.92 (16.12)

.56

.578

-1.13, 2.02

1711

Note: Bolded p-values are significant.
Participants in the anti-Christian bias conditions reported significantly more negative
attitudes toward atheists, agnostics, and Muslims than those in the control condition. These
effects may be driven by threatened Christians perceiving these groups as symbolically
threatening (a function of holding conflicting values and having enough influence to spread these
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value). If so, attitudes toward Jews and Hindus may not have differed because (1) these groups
either may not have been perceived as influential or (2) these groups may not have been
perceived as holding values that conflict with Christians. I have no data to support the second
possibility, but I believe the first is unlikely because attitudes toward Jews and Hindus in
Experiment 2 did not differ by condition at high levels of group influence (+1 SD). This suggests
that even Christians who perceive these groups as relatively influential do not perceive them as a
threat. Finally, attitudes toward Black people did not differ by condition. This might result from
an understanding that Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to identify as
Christians (Masci et al., 2018).

5.2 Are Christians Actually Victims of Bias?
Because my research identifies real, deleterious consequences of Christians perceiving
bias against their group, it is important to identify why Christians perceive bias. One glaring
possible reason Christians may report increasing bias is that Christians actually are increasingly
victimized in America; however, there is little evidence to support that possibility. American
Christians are vastly underrepresented in religious hate-crime rates as they only account for
under 10% of religious-based crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2018). Additionally,
Americans’ negativity toward conservative Christians (i.e., Fundamentalist Christians) did not
increase over time and aggregated attitudes are generally neutral or positive (Yancey, 2018).
Furthermore, biology faculty evaluated purported Christian Ph.D applicants similarly to Atheist
applicants and applicants without a religious identity (Barnes et al., 2020). Biology faculty did
show preference toward a UNICEF volunteer who submitted a letter of recommendation about
commitment to service compared to an evangelical Christian mission trip volunteer who
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submitted a letter of recommendation about Christian faith, however. Overall, there is no
compelling evidence to support the notion that Americans are biased against Christians.
Given that extant research does not support the notion that Christians are victims of bias
in America, future research should examine the psychological processes that give rise to highstatus groups perceiving victimization (e.g., Wilkins et al., 2021). Regardless, this paper
examines the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias, even if these perceptions are not justified.

5.3 Limitations and Future Directions
The largest limitation of my set of experiments is that I have yet to successfully
manipulate the influence of gay and lesbian people and transgender people as a group. While
Experiment 2 provides evidence that these groups’ influence increases anti-gay and antitransgender prejudice for experimentally threatened Christians, it is possible that the moderating
effect of influence is explained by a covariate with influence (e.g., power or popularity). Because
influence was associated with favorable group attitudes, one possibility is that participants are
inclined to evaluate groups as influential if they are personally influenced by the group or if they
perceive the group as likeable. I attempted to reduce this concern by manipulating influence of a
job in Experiment 3. However, Experiments 2 and 3 test related but separate processes because
Experiment 2 tests whether group influence exacerbates prejudice from perceiving anti-Christian
bias while Experiment 3 tests whether perceiving anti-Christian bias motivates Christians to
discriminate by denying a gay person of influence. However, because I did not manipulate
influence of the group or an individual who belongs to this group, though, I am unable to provide
further evidence that LGT people’s influence increases symbolic threat for Christians who
perceive bias against their group.
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Another flaw of Experiment 3 is that participants might not believe an editor is likely to
significantly influence American culture. While the description of the job described the
newspaper as being widely read across the country, participants may still have had trouble
perceiving a campus newspaper editor as truly influential. For this reason, manipulating the
influence of a single editor job may have been an overly conservative test of the effect of
influence, which could contribute to our failure to detect an effect of anti-Christian bias for those
in the influential editor position. Alternatively, the conservativeness of the job choice illustrates
that positions do not have to be overly influential for threatened Christians to discriminate
against gay people.
An additional flaw of Experiment 3 is that I did not measure attitudes toward a
transgender applicant. I chose to use a gay applicant instead of a transgender applicant because in
Experiment 2, symbolic threat only marginally mediated the relationship between the antiChristian bias manipulation and anti-transgender prejudice. I expect that perceived hirability of a
transgender applicant would resemble the results observed in Experiment 3 because attitudes
toward gay and lesbian and transgender people were similar in Experiments 1 and 2. Still,
attitudes toward gay and transgender people do not perfectly resemble the other (see Worthen,
2013) and future research should examine whether threatened Christians perceive transgender
people as less hirable for an influential rather than uninfluential job.
Similarly, future research on the effects of perceiving anti-Christian bias should examine
whether attitudes toward gay and transgender people depend on gender of the target. Because
stereotypes and attitudes regarding gay and transgender people differ based on target gender (see
Worthen, 2013 for a review), it is possible that gay and transgender people are differentially
perceived as holding values that conflict with Christians depending on gender. This is an
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important distinction because the effect of anti-Christian bias on anti-gay and anti-transgender
prejudice was mediated (marginally for transgender attitudes) by symbolic threat. Thus, if some
subgroups are perceived as violating Christian values to a lesser extent than others, symbolic
threat may increase prejudice less toward these groups.
Relatedly, my examination of attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in these
experiments may more closely resemble attitudes toward gay men than lesbian women. Research
participants tend to think about men when evaluating groups with nearly equal gender
representation (e.g., Black people) and tend to presume individual targets with unspecified
gender identities are male (Bailey et al., 2019). Because I measured attitudes toward “Gay and
lesbian women” instead of merely “Gay people”, and thus reminded participants of both male
and female targets, it is possible that this tendency to think of male targets was reduced, though.
The tendency to think of men over women may also apply to transgender targets. However, this
may depend on each participant’s acceptance of transgender identities and whether they
categorize transgender targets based on assigned sex at birth or based on gender. Because
acceptance of transgender identities is not universally accepted, it is unclear whether transgender
men or transgender women are presumed more typical of transgender people in general.
Similarly, the measured attitudes toward LGT people in these experiments may be more
representative of attitudes toward White than Black LGT people. For example, stereotypes of
gay men in general share more overlap with stereotypes of White gay men than Black gay men
(Calabrese et al., 2018). Moreover, this experiment found stereotypes of Black men overlap more
with those of Black heterosexual men than Black gay men. Because stereotypes toward Black
gay men are relatively separate from attitudes toward Black men and Gay men, future research
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should examine attitudes toward Black LGT people specifically and how they are affected by
perceptions of anti-Christian bias and influence.
Finally, in these three experiments, I did not collect data to rule out an alternate
interpretation of my results: perceiving anti-Christian bias may increase prejudice toward gay
and transgender people because these groups are perceived as biased against Christians.
However, we collected data on this possibility in the pilot experiment, albeit with a low sample
size; participants primed with anti-Christian bias were not more likely to think that gay or lesbian
people and transgender people were biased against Christians than participants in the control
condition, t(86) = .31, p = .761, 95%CI: [-.59, .80] and t(86) = .22, p = .825, 95%CI: [-.63, .79],
respectively. Moreover, the extent to which our Christian sample collectively thought gay or
lesbian people and transgender people were biased against Christians was relatively low (M =
3.16, SD = 1.63 and M = 3.23, SD = 1.67, respectively where a score of 1 indicates Strongly
Disagree and 7 indicates Strongly Agree). This suggests that gay and lesbian people and
transgender people are not perceived as especially biased against Christians, and the antiChristian bias manipulation does not increase perceptions that these groups in particular hold
anti-Christian sentiments.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Bill Barr warned of an “unremitting assault on religion and traditional values” (United
States Department of Justice, 2019), and my research identifies real consequences LGBT people
will face as a result of perceiving this attack. LGBT people are becoming more accepted globally
(Poushter & Kent, 2020), and their influence is bound to increase as a result. Christians who
perceive bias may be inclined to discriminate against LGBT people as influence grows and may
try to slow LGBT people’s burgeoning influence whenever possible (e.g., by not hiring an LGBT
person for an influential position).

47

Chapter 7. References
Bailey, A. H., LaFrance, M., & Dovidio, J. F. (2019). Is Man the Measure of All Things? A
Social Cognitive Account of Androcentrism. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
23(4), 307–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318782848
Barnes, M. E., Truong, J. M., Grunspan, D. Z., & Brownell, S. E. (2020). Are scientists biased
against Christians? Exploring real and perceived bias against Christians in academic
biology. PLOS ONE, 15(1), e0226826. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226826
Brambilla, M., & Butz, D. A. (2013). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: Macro-level
symbolic threat increases prejudice against gay men. Social Psychology, 44(5), 311–319.
https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000127
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The
Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(1), 27–34.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932
Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination
among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(1), 135–149. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.77.1.135
Calabrese, S. K., Earnshaw, V. A., Magnus, M., Hansen, N. B., Krakower, D. S., Underhill, K.,
Mayer, K. H., Kershaw, T. S., Betancourt, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2018). Sexual
Stereotypes Ascribed to Black Men Who Have Sex with Men: An Intersectional
Analysis. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 47(1), 143–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508016-0911-3
Campbell, M., Hinton, J. D. X., & Anderson, J. R. (2019). A systematic review of the
relationship between religion and attitudes toward transgender and gender-variant people.
International Journal of Transgenderism, 20(1), 21–38.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15532739.2018.1545149
Christianity. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianity
Cook, C. L., Cottrell, C. A., & Webster, G. D. (2015). No good without God: Antiatheist
prejudice as a function of threats to morals and values. Psychology of Religion and
Spirituality, 7(3), 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000013
Cox, D., & Jones, R. P. (2017). America’s Changing Religious Identity. PRRI.
https://www.prri.org/research/american-religious-landscape-christian-religiouslyunaffiliated/
48

Craig, M. A., & Richeson, J. A. (2014). On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority” America:
Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’
Political Ideology. Psychological Science, 25(6), 1189–1197.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614527113
Crandall, C. S. (1994). Prejudice against fat people: Ideology and self-interest. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 882–894. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.66.5.882
Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., Krauss, S. W., & Heled, E. (2010). A Tripartite Approach to RightWing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model:
Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism. Political Psychology, 31(5), 685–715.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x
Eisenhauer, J. G. (2021). Meta-analysis and mega-analysis: A simple introduction. Teaching
Statistics, 43(1), 21–27.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2018). 2018 Hate Crime Statistics.
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hatecrime/2018/topic-pages/victims
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The
Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup
Bias. European Review of Social Psychology, 4(1), 1–26.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779343000004
Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why Don’t We Practice What We Preach? A
Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
14(1), 126–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309352179
HB4733 (2015)
Herek, G. M. (1988). Heterosexuals’ Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Correlates and
Gender Differences. The Journal of Sex Research, 25(4), 451–477.
Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. (2010). Priming Christian Religious Concepts
Increases Racial Prejudice. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 1(2), 119–126.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550609357246
Jones, R. P. (2016). The End of White Christian America. Simon & Schuster.
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-End-of-White-Christian-America/RobertP-Jones/9781501122323
Jones, R. P., Cox, D., Cooper, B., & Lienesch, R. (2017). Majority of Americans Oppose
Transgender Bathroom Restrictions. PRRI. https://www.prri.org/research/lgbttransgender-bathroom-discrimination-religious-liberty/
49

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial
threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40(3), 414–431.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.3.414
Kunst, J. R., & Thomsen, L. (2015). Prodigal Sons: Dual Abrahamic Categorization Mediates the
Detrimental Effects of Religious Fundamentalism on Christian–Muslim Relations. The
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 25(4), 293–306.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2014.937965
LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes,
and group behavior (pp. ix, 310). John Wiley & Sons.
Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing
data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 49(2),
433–442. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-016-0727-z
Masci, D. (2019). Many Americans see religious discrimination in U.S. – especially against
Muslims. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/05/17/many-americans-see-religious-discrimination-in-u-s-especially-againstmuslims/
Masci, D., Mohamed, B., & Smith, G. A. (2018). Black Americans more likely to be Christian,
Protestant than US adults overall. Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/23/black-americans-are-more-likelythan-overall-public-to-be-christian-protestant/
McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F.
Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism. (1986-98698004; pp. 91–125). Academic Press.
http://libproxy.wustl.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&d
b=psyh&AN=1986-98698-004&site=ehost-live&scope=site
McCoy, S. K., & Major, B. (2007). Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification of
inequality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(3), 341–351.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.04.009
Newport, F. (2012). Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage.
Gallup.Com. https://news.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americansopposed-sex-marriage.aspx
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015).
Pascoe, E. A., & Richman, L. S. (2009). Perceived Discrimination and Health: A Meta-Analytic
Review. Psychological Bulletin, 135(4), 531–554. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016059
50

Pasek, M. H., & Cook, J. E. (2019). Religion From the Target’s Perspective: A Portrait of
Religious Threat and Its Consequences in the United States. Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 10(1), 82–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617739089
Pew Research Center. (2019, October 17). In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid
Pace. Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project.
https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapidpace/
Portnoy, J. (2016, February 12). Religious freedom or license to discriminate? Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/religious-freedom-or-license-todiscriminate/2016/02/12/5775fe9e-d114-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html
Poushter, J., & Kent, N. (2020, June 25). The Global Divide on Homosexuality Persists. Pew
Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/06/25/global-divide-onhomosexuality-persists/
Ramos, M. R., Cassidy, C., Reicher, S., & Haslam, S. A. (2012). A longitudinal investigation of
the rejection-identification hypothesis. The British Journal of Social Psychology, 51(4),
642–660. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02029.x
Religious Freedom Defense Act, SB2164 (2015).
Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach to Intergroup Threat Theory:
Manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. European
Review of Social Psychology, 29(1), 212–255.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2018.1537049
Rodriguez, E. M. (2009). At the Intersection of Church and Gay: A Review of the Psychological
Research on Gay and Lesbian Christians. Journal of Homosexuality, 57(1), 5–38.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00918360903445806
Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Postmes, T., & Garcia, A. (2014). The consequences of
perceived discrimination for psychological well-being: A meta-analytic review.
Psychological Bulletin, 140(4), 921–948. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035754
Sears, D. O. (1983). The person-positivity bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
44(2), 233–250. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.2.233
Sommerfeldt, C. (2016, December 2). Donald Trump’s attorney general Jeff Sessions fought to
derail gay-rights conference. Daily News.
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/trump-ag-jeff-sessions-fought-derail-gayrights-conference-article-1.2895887
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In Reducing
prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23–45). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
51

Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Morrison, K. R. (2009). Intergroup threat theory. In Handbook of
prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 43–59). Psychology Press.
Tamir, C., Connaughton, A., & Salazar, A. M. (2020, July 20). The Global God Divide. Pew
Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/20/the-global-god-divide/
United States Department of Justice. (2019, October 14). Attorney General William P. Barr
Delivers Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at
the University of Notre Dame. https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generalwilliam-p-barr-delivers-remarks-law-school-and-de-nicola-center-ethics
Vandermaas-Peeler, A., Cox, D., Fisch-Friedman, M., & Jones, R. P. (2018). Diversity, Division,
Discrimination: The State of Young America | MTV/PRRI Report. PRRI.
https://www.prri.org/research/mtv-culture-and-religion/
Wilkins, C. L., Wellman, J. D., Toosi, N. R., Miller, C. A., Lisnek, J. A., & Martin, L. A. (2021).
Is LGBT progress seen as an attack on Christians?: Examining Christian/sexual
orientation zero-sum beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, No
Pagination Specified-No Pagination Specified. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000363
Worthen, M. G. F. (2013). An Argument for Separate Analyses of Attitudes Toward Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual Men, Bisexual Women, MtF and FtM Transgender Individuals. Sex Roles,
68(11), 703–723. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-012-0155-1
Yancey, G. (2018). Has Society Grown More Hostile Towards Conservative Christians?
Evidence from ANES Surveys. Review of Religious Research, 60(1), 71–94.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-017-0303-8

52

